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Abstract
The importance of financial markets and international capital flows has increased greatly since the
1990s. How does this affect the effectiveness of monetary policy? We analyse the transmission of
monetary policy in two important financial centres, the United States and the United Kingdom.
Studying the responses of mortgage and corporate spreads, we find evidence in favour of an
important financial channel in both countries. Our identification strategy allows us to study the
effect of movements in the policy instruments and forward guidance, broadly defined. We also
analyse international financial spillovers, which we find to be asymmetric. (JEL: E32, E43, E44,
G01)
1. Introduction
How does monetary policy work in the “capitals of capital”1? Monetary policy affects
the real economy via different channels. Do these channels depend on financial
development and international financial linkages? On being a hegemon or not in the
international monetary system? In a Keynesian or neo-Keynesian world featuring
nominal stickiness, output is demand determined in the short run and monetary
policy stimulates aggregate consumption and investment. There are no first-order
responses of spreads or risk premia (see Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008) for classic
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discussions). But when there are frictions in capital markets, they amplify shocks
and affect monetary policy transmission. In such models, for example Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in the net worth of
borrowers, whether they be financial intermediaries or firms. This leads to an increase
in lending and an increase in aggregate demand. This is the credit channel of monetary
policy (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). Another stream of research has emphasized the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu 2012; Bruno and Shin 2015;
Coimbra and Rey 2017) where financial intermediation plays a key role and a monetary
policy loosening relaxes leverage constraints. These views of the transmission channel
are complementary to one another.
In this paper, we start from the observation that the importance of financial markets
and international capital flows has increased greatly since the 1990s (see Gourinchas
and Rey 2014; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). We focus on the transmission channels
of monetary policy that occur through financial intermediation and asset prices (credit
channel or risk-taking channel) that we subsume in a broadly defined financial
channel of monetary policy. We also note that the recent financial crisis underlines the
importance of capital market frictions in macroeconomic modelling. We analyse the
effectiveness of monetary policy in two important financial centres, the United States
and the United Kingdom, the “capitals of capital”. Our aim is not only to study the
transmission of US and UK monetary policies via the financial channel domestically,
but also to look at potential international spillovers of these monetary policies.2
The United States has been at the centre of the International Monetary System
at least since Bretton Woods, playing major roles in goods and financial markets.
The dollar is the main currency in banking and a large share of foreign exchange
turnover is in dollars: according to the April 2016 BIS survey, 87.6% of the share of
currency turnover (out of 200% because a transaction involves two currencies) was
in dollars. Approximately 60% of disclosed official reserves are held in US dollars.
The United Kingdom was the previous currency hegemon. The internationalization
of the pound began early in the 1800s and continued for more than a century. The
industrial revolution transformed Britain into the world’s richest economy and leading
trading nation. The years after the First World War saw the decline of Britain as an
international power, but sterling kept a lot of its functions. Only after the Second World
War did the decline of sterling accelerate, with a sharp rise in the use of the dollar as
an international currency (see Rey 2001). Chit¸u, Eichengreen, and Mehl (2014) find
that the share of international reserves held in sterling went from about 80% in 1950
to less than 10% in 2013. London is still however a major financial centre receiving
and sending large amounts of financial flows. Both countries are home to deep and
sophisticated financial markets and have important international linkages. They are
the “capitals of capital”. Recent work has drawn attention to the importance of the US
Federal Reserve in setting the tone in international financial markets worldwide with
important effects on capital flows, risk taking of financial intermediaries, and on risky
2. See also Passari and Rey (2015) and Rey (2016).
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asset prices. Comovements in those variables across the planet is what Rey (2013)
called the global financial cycle (see also Bernanke 2016; Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey 2015). But just how sensitive is a country like the United Kingdom to the global
financial cycle? As the former centre country of the international monetary system
how independent is its monetary policy from the current hegemon? And how potent
is UK domestic monetary policy in the current environment of large capital mobility
across borders?
The empirical analysis of monetary policy effectiveness has a long and
distinguished tradition, making it one of the most studied empirical questions in
macroeconomics (for a recent excellent survey see Ramey (2016)). We identify
monetary policy shocks using high-frequency asset price movements around monetary
policy events (such as Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements)
following Bagliano and Favero (1999); Kuttner (2001); Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2005); Gertler and Karadi (2015); Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and others. The
idea behind the identification scheme is that only monetary policy or monetary policy
announcements move asset prices in tight windows around monetary policy events. As
in Gertler and Karadi (2015), we use these high-frequency price movements as external
instruments in a proxy SVAR (see Stock and Watson 2008; Stock and Watson 2012;
Mertens and Ravn 2013). Although this methodology has been used in the context
of the United States, it has been very rarely used elsewhere, due to data availability
and differences in monetary policy frameworks. More generally, there are surprisingly
few papers focussing on the effect of UK monetary policy on the economy.3 Cloyne
and Hu¨rtgen (2016) construct a new measure of monetary policy innovations for the
United Kingdom based on the Romer and Romer (2004) methodology. They estimate
peak responses of about 0.6% for industrial production for a 100-bp tightening of
the Bank of England and an inflation rate decrease of about 100 bp, but they do
not investigate the financial channels of monetary policy. Cesa-Bianchi, Thwaites,
and Vicondoa (2016) is a contemporaneous paper to ours that uses local projection
methods and high-frequency instruments (with a different methodology and different
variables from ours) to study UK monetary policy. It finds in particular evidence that
a tightening raises forward real rates and lowers break-even inflation.
One of our paper’s contribution is to take seriously the importance of the different
institutional setups of the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of monetary
policy framework when performing the estimations. We show that the methodology
used by Gertler and Karadi (2015) in the US context where they exploit surprises in
specific Fed Funds Futures market cannot be straightforwardly applied to the United
Kingdom. Instead, we use a set of high-frequency instruments (Short Sterling Futures
(SS)) that, unlike Fed Funds Futures, do not aggregate only information about the policy
rate. Thanks to different timings of monetary policy events in the United Kingdom, we
allow for a separate identification of monetary policy rate shocks and forward guidance
3. For an early study using international data including the UK see Sims (1992). For a study of UK
monetary policy using a VAR with sign restrictions see Mountford (2005). Ellis, Mumtaz, and Zabczyk
(2014) estimate a FAVAR model.
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shocks, broadly defined as shocks affecting the price of SS during tight windows
around minutes and inflation reports. In our sample, most of the information about
monetary policy in the United Kingdom is communicated around minutes and inflation
reports, whereas policy rate announcements are largely void of information content
once the zero lower bound is hit in March 2009. In the United States, monetary policy
announcements about the policy rate are accompanied by a statement containing some
information about future policy and the state of the economy. For the United States,
we confirm the importance of a financial channel of monetary policy as described
by Gertler and Karadi (2015). We also find evidence of important spillovers of US
monetary policy on the United Kingdom, despite the flexible sterling exchange rate.
Indeed, in terms of the financial variables we study, we find that Fed monetary policy
is almost as potent in the United Kingdom as it is at home.
We also have new results on the domestic effects of UK monetary policy. We
find evidence of a financial channel, measured by the responses of mortgage and
corporate spreads to the Bank of England monetary policy shocks. The financial
channel is roughly as important for the United Kingdom as it is in the United States.
Furthermore, we cannot find any evidence of spillovers going from the United Kingdom
to the United States, validating the view that the United States is the current hegemon
of the International Monetary System.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review briefly
the theoretical literature on the credit and risk-taking channels of monetary policy. In
Section 3, we describe the monetary policy frameworks of the US Federal Reserve and
the Bank of England, pointing out the differences in the timing of the announcements
and in their communication strategies. Section 4 presents our identification schemes
for the United States and the United Kingdom, making use of different financial
instruments, whereas Section 5 describes the empirical model used. Finally, Section 6
analyses our results in both countries as well as the international spillovers.
2. The Financial Channel of Monetary Policy
The literature has long ago recognized agency problems as an important source of
business cycle amplification (Bernanke and Gertler 1989). When agency costs between
borrowers and lenders are important, there is a wedge between the opportunity cost
of internal finance and the cost of external finance: the external finance premium.
The financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999) has been
mostly studied in the context of non-financial corporations and households (Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997).4 Part of the recent literature has focused on the role of these frictions
in affecting monetary policy transmission. In such models, expansionary monetary
policy leads to an increase in the net worth of borrowers, whether they be financial
4. There is a rapidly growing literature modelling some type of balance sheet constraints: Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2010); Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012); Lorenzoni (2008).
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intermediaries or firms. This mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
decreasing the size of the external finance premium. Hence, there is an increase in
lending. This is the credit channel of monetary policy.5 Another stream of research has
emphasized the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu 2012; Bruno
and Shin 2015), of which Coimbra and Rey (2017) provide a general equilibrium
model. Coimbra and Rey (2017) features heterogeneous intermediaries with limited
liability. Monetary loosening induces more risk taking due to increased risk shifting
by the less risk averse intermediaries, which end up dominating the market in good
times. These intermediaries price assets marginally and compress risk premia during
booms. Both the credit channel (or net worth channel) and the risk-taking channels
are part of what we call the financial channel of monetary policy transmission. From
an empirical point of view, both lead to a loosening of financial constraints and a
decrease in risk premium when there is a monetary policy expansion. They are hard to
disentangle using only macroeconomic data but analysing the dynamics of the cross-
section of leverage of intermediaries helps. A distinctive feature of Coimbra and Rey
(2017) is that a monetary expansion when the interest rate level is already low increases
risk concentration and leads to skewness in the distribution of leverage across banks.
Analysing thoroughly the financial channel of monetary policy will in general require
studying the responses to monetary policy shocks of asset prices (credit spreads, risk
premia, exchange rates) and, where possible, leverage of intermediaries or capital flows
in conjunction with the responses of the standard variables of a monetary VAR (output,
inflation).6
Most movements in the policy rates (whether the Fed Funds rate or the Bank rate in
the United Kingdom) are due to the systematic component of monetary policy, which
reacts endogenously to developments in the economy and to changes in expectations
of the policy makers regarding future conditions. It is therefore famously difficult to
estimate causal effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables. Estimating
causal effects of monetary policy on financial variables may be even more of a
challenge, given how quickly asset prices respond to monetary policy. In a standard
Cholesky ordering,7 it is assumed that no variables can respond to the policy rate
within the period, which is hardly a tenable proposition for asset prices. It becomes
therefore paramount to look for alternative identification schemes to analyse the
financial channel of monetary policy transmission. One possibility is to use the Romer
and Romer (2004) narrative approach, a road pursued by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
(2015) for the United States and Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen (2016) for the United Kingdom
5. Recently, there has been a flurry of models featuring explicitly financial intermediaries (Adrian and
Boyarchenko 2015; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014; Coimbra 2016; He and Krishnamurthy 2013).
Some aim at analysing specifically monetary policy transmission, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010).
6. For empirical analyses of the risk taking channel using very granular balance sheet data see Jimenez
et al. (2014) and Morais, Peydro, and Ruiz Ortega (2015). For a large Bayesian VAR analysis combining real
economy and international financial variables including capital flows and credit aggregates see Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2015).
7. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
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(though the latter paper does not investigate the financial channel of monetary policy).
Another possibility, which we pursue in this paper is to use a high-frequency approach
to identification8. The advantage of this method is that it will allow us to discuss not
only the causal effect of movements in the policy rates on asset prices, but also the
effect of forward guidance. This is where an intimate knowledge of monetary policy
frameworks is required.
3. Monetary Policy Frameworks
3.1. Federal Reserve
The monetary policy framework of the United States is well known. The FOMC sets
monetary policy. It consists of the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and five Reserve Bank presidents. The FOMC holds eight regularly
scheduled meetings during the year, and other meetings as needed. After each meeting,
the committee releases the statement that contains the decisions regarding monetary
policy implementations (including the Fed Funds rate target) as well as a short summary
of the current and prospective state of the economy. So for our purposes, this means
that at the time of FOMC meetings we have not only a statement about the policy rate,
but also a statement which we define broadly as forward guidance and which reveals
information about future policy and future state of the economy as seen by the FOMC.
The minutes of regularly scheduled meetings are released 3 weeks after the date of the
policy decision.9
3.2. Bank of England
The Bank of England follows an inflation target since 1992. Since 1997, the Bank of
England has had operational independence. Starting in January 2000, the UK Monetary
Policy Committee meets monthly to decide on monetary policy. After every meeting,
the decisions regarding the policy rate are announced by publishing a news release on
the website of the Bank of England at 12:00 p.m. the first or the second Thursday of each
month. From 5 March 2009, the Monetary Policy Committee in addition to setting the
Bank rate also sets a target for the level of assets to be financed by central bank reserves.
The Bank of England provides information about the current and expected state of the
economy in separate news releases. The Bank of England Inflation report is published
four times a year and becomes available at 10:30 a.m. on the second Wednesday of
November, August, May, and February. Minutes of each Monetary Policy Committee
meeting are published at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday 2 weeks after the meeting has taken
place. The important difference between the way the monetary policy is conducted in
8. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2016) also use a high-frequency approach for part of their analyses.
9. www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm
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the United Kingdom compared to the United States is that the policy rate decision at the
time of the announcement is not accompanied by any statement about the economy or
about future policy. Information about the economy or future policy comes at distinct
times when minutes and the inflation reports are released. Therefore, this setting allows
us to disentangle two separate effects of monetary policy: the direct effect of the policy
rate change from the effect of forward guidance defined broadly as news on the future
path of interest rates or on the Bank view on the future state of the economy. For the
United Kingdom, the announcement dates and times are those of releases of Monetary
Policy Committee decisions, minutes, and inflation reports releases. The current data
set contains 180 policy rates decisions, 179 min releases, and 60 inflation reports from
January 2000 to January 2015 (between 1997 and 2000 announcement times were not
scheduled and before 1999 min were released with a different timing).10
4. Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks
The definition of a monetary policy shock is not an easy one to formulate. Most
movements in the policy rates are due to the systematic component of monetary
policy rather than to deviations from it. We define a monetary policy shock as an
unanticipated movement in monetary policy or a piece of news about future monetary
policy, exogenous to other current and lagged endogenous variables in the model
and uncorrelated with other exogenous shocks. This can be interpreted as a shift in
central bank preferences, a change in the relative standing of people in the monetary
committee, a change in the judgement about future policy or in the expectations about
future economic developments.11 This shock may be about the current policy stance
or about forward guidance, broadly defined. Identifying shocks allows us to estimate
the causal effect of monetary policy on macroeconomic and financial variables.
4.1. High-Frequency Identification
We use a high-frequency identification strategy for the United Kingdom and the United
States. The general idea behind that identification strategy is that in the short window
around monetary policy announcements (fifteen- or thirty-minute), it is very likely
that the most important shock hitting the economy is the monetary policy shock.
For such a strategy, we need to discuss in detail not only the timing of monetary
policy announcements and what they reveal (pure policy rate decision versus news
about forward guidance and the economy), but also which market instruments are
10. The schedule of communications changed in August 2015. More details can be found at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2016/070.aspx
11. For a discussion on the informational content of high-frequency monetary surprises in the context
of monetary policy shock identification see Miranda-Agrippino (2016). For an extensive and thorough
discussion on identification and propagation of monetary policy shocks in the domestic context see
Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017).
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used to measure surprises (futures of the policy rate or other market prices) and what
information these instruments price.
4.1.1. Federal Funds Futures (FF). For the United States, several papers use a high-
frequency identification of monetary policy shocks by analysing movements in Federal
Funds Futures (FF) prices around FOMC announcements12. The FF contract gives an
insight into market opinion of the average daily Fed Funds effective rate for a given
calendar month. It is traded on the Chicago Board of Trade exchange and is quoted as
100 less the interest rate. On every trading day, the contract is available for the first 36
calendar months into the future. This instrument is used in the market to hedge against
or speculate on changes in short-term interest rates given innovations to the monetary
policy in the United States13.
Gertler and Karadi (2015) combine this high-frequency identification method with
a proxy SVAR to study the effect of monetary policy on financial variables. Specifically,
they use the movement of the fourth Fed Funds futures contract (FF4) around the times
when the FOMC press release is published to identify monetary policy shocks. This
particular future contract measures how the market revises its expectations about the
Fed Funds rate 3 months from the current date given the new information released
by the FOMC. The movements of futures prices are not necessarily expected to be
positively correlated with movements of the spot prices as they measure changes in the
expectations of market participants. For example, markets might have been pricing in
a larger move of the Fed Funds rate and might have to readjust the price of the future
contract in a direction opposite to the actual move of the rate. Or, if the rate was not
changed at the current meeting, market participants may increase the probability of
the target rate being readjusted in the next meeting. The target rate change itself is an
important component in anchoring market expectations, but it is not the only part of
the press release that affects the market’s views of the Fed Funds rate 3 months ahead.
The short statement that FOMC releases together with the rate decision is a crucial
new piece of information that becomes available to the market participants at the time
of the announcement. As a result, market expectations about rates movements in the
next quarter are being revised also according to the content of the statement. Hence,
surprises in the Fed Funds futures do not reflect a pure shock of the policy rate but also
a forward guidance shock, broadly defined as some information about future policy or
judgement about the future of the economy. Gertler and Karadi (2015) uses the shocks
in the FF4 to instrument the 1-year government bond rate as the policy rate in their
VAR. Their justification for using the shocks to instrument the 1-year rate is precisely
to capture the effect of forward guidance on financial and macroeconomic variables
in the VAR. They find that a monetary policy tightening of 20 bp in the 1-year rate
leads to an increase in mortgage rates of about 7 bp and of 15 bp in the corporate bond
12. See Bagliano and Favero (1999), Kuttner (2001), Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015),
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013).
13. Please refer to the CME group website for the full description of the contract.
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rate. In each case, the increase is due to the excess premium, defined as the sum of the
credit spread and the term premium.
In this paper, we follow the literature as far as the US data are concerned and
use the change in the price of the Fed Funds Future contract (FF4) measured in a
tight window around each policy announcement to instrument the US monetary policy
shock. US data are special in the sense that the Fed Funds futures directly represent
market opinion about the policy rate for a given month. No such instruments are traded
in the United Kingdom. However, short-term interest rate futures are available and can
potentially play a similar role as the Fed Funds future contract in identifying monetary
policy shocks.
4.1.2. Short-Sterling Future (SS). For the United Kingdom, there is no equivalent
to the Fed Funds Future contract stricto sensu. SS is a 3-month sterling future that
is traded at ICE Futures Europe (part of the Intercontinental Exchange). The futures
quotation is defined as 100 less an interest rate on 3-month deposit of £5,00,000 on
the contract settlement date.14 This contract is an analogue of the eurodollar future
contract in the United States, and given that this is the only future contract on short-
term interest rates available for the UK economy with long-enough time series, we use
it in our analysis.
It is important to keep in mind that even though short-term interest rates are closely
linked to the policy rate, there is not a one-to-one mapping. By measuring the difference
in prices of SS around the announcements, we are capturing changes in expectations
of the market regarding the costs of short-term credit.
Tick-by-tick data for trading activities on all SS contracts available on each date
of monetary policy announcements were acquired from the Thompson Reuters Tick
history data set. We apply the same methodology as Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) to
construct surprises. We measure the difference in the price of the future contract in a
tight window before (10 min) and after (20 min) every monetary policy event.15
4.2. Differences Between the United States and the United Kingdom
Because of the differences in traded instruments that we highlighted and because of the
different timing of announcements between the United States and the United Kingdom,
we cannot replicate existing studies on the effect of US monetary policy on UK data. SS
price movements around announcements are not capturing only the market surprises
about current and future path of the policy instrument. What we can do however is to
measure how the market expectations of the cost of short-term bank credit changes
given innovations to monetary policy. Changes in the cost of short-term bank credit
reflect a combination of expectations regarding the future path of policy rates, the risk
14. For more details regarding the ICE Futures Europe FSS contract specifications, please refer to
www.theice.com/api/productguide/spec/37650330/pdf.
15. More details about construction of surprises are in Appendix B.
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premium of the LIBOR—including possible counterparty risk—and demand for cash
in the banking sector. Furthermore, we can study how this shock propagates through
other interest rates to the economy.
Another important difference of our analysis compared to the existing literature
on monetary policy VARs is that we can obtain a new “clean” measure of forward
guidance, broadly defined. The reason is that, unlike the Fed, the Bank of England
communicates pure policy rate decisions at a time that is distinct from the releases of
minutes and of the inflation report. Minutes and reports provide a lot of information
to market participants regarding the future monetary policy and the judgement of the
Bank about the future state of the economy. This allows us to separate the market
reactions to the policy rate announcements from the effect of the information about the
state of the economy and on the course of future policy. In the case of the United States,
these two effects are partially mixed together because the rate decision is accompanied
by a short statement in the press release published by FOMC. In the United Kingdom,
it is possible to measure the first effect by taking the difference of SS prices around
the MPC decisions. Market reaction to Bank of England’s forward guidance can be
directly estimated by focussing on the movement of SS prices around releases of the
minutes of MPC meetings and releases of the inflation reports.
5. Proxy SVAR
Like Gertler and Karadi (2015), we combine high-frequency identification of shocks,
which we use as external instruments for the monetary policy variable and a VAR
approach to analyse the dynamic responses of real and financial variables, building on
Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013).
Let our general structural form of the VAR be
AYt D
mX
kD1
CkYtk C "t :
The following reduced form representation can be obtained with the reduced form
shock ut expressed as a function of the structural shocks ut D P"t and where Dk D
A1Ck and P D A1,
Yt D
mX
kD1
DkYtk C ut :
We define † as the variancecovariance matrix of the reduced form model. We
have † D EŒutu
0
t  D EŒPP 0. We assume imt 2 Yt to be the monetary policy indicator
that in our case will be either the US 1-year government bond rate or the UK 5-year
rate. The exogenous variation of the policy indicator stems from the policy shock "mt .
Finally, p stands for the column in P corresponding to the impact of the policy shock "mt
on each element of the vector of reduced form residuals ut. For the impulse responses
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of our economic and financial variables to a policy shock we run,
Yt D
mX
kD1
DkYtk C p"mt :
Our instruments Zt for the monetary policy variables are the surprises to the price of Fed
Funds futures or SS in windows around monetary policy announcements. In order for
the vector of instrumental variables Zt to be a valid set of instruments for the monetary
policy shock "mt , we need EŒzt"m
0
t D ' and EŒzt"d
0
t D 0, where "dt stands for any
structural shock but the monetary policy shock (which could be a rate or a forward
guidance shock). We follow Mertens and Ravn (2013) to estimate the variation in the
reduced form residual for the policy indicator due to the structural monetary policy
shock. To compute the estimates of vector p, as a first step we compute the estimates
of the reduced form residuals vector ut from the least squares regression of the reduced
form representation. We denote udt the reduced form residual for variable d that is
different from the policy indicator and umt the reduced form residual for the policy
indicator. Denoted by pd 2 p, the response of udt to a unit increase of one standard
deviation in the policy shock "mt . A few simple steps allow to identify pd.16
6. Results
6.1. United States: A Hegemonic Monetary Policy?
We run the US VAR on monthly data for the period July 1979 to June 2012, and we
use Feds Funds Futures surprises (FF4) around FOMC announcements as instruments
for the period January 1999 to June 2012. We report the F-stats for each of our VARs.
Following the literature, F-stats above 10 validate the strength of our instruments. In all
our monthly VARS, we use 12 lags as is customary. We are not the first ones to analyse
the financial channel of monetary policy for the United States. We confirm the results
of Gertler and Karadi (2015) in a VAR in which we added the dollar sterling exchange
rate. Figure 1 shows that a 20-bp tightening in the US 1-year rate leads to increases in
mortgage spreads (point estimate increase of about 5 bp). This is evidence that some
form of capital market friction is playing a role in the transmission of monetary policy
in the United States. The tightening leads to an appreciation of the US dollar-sterling
16. From the two-stage least-squares regression of ud
t
on um
t
and using the vector of instrumental
variables Z
t
, we can compute an estimate of the ratio pd=pm. It is obtained by first regressing um
t
on the
vector of instruments yieldingdum
t
. As the variation indum
t
is only due to "m
t
, a second-stage regression
of ud
t
ondum
t
provides a consistent estimate of pd=pm. The estimated reduced from variancecovariance
matrix is then used to obtain an estimate of pm using the second-stage regression, allowing to identify pd.
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FIGURE 1. Responses of US variables to a 20-bp increase in the US 1-year rate. Instruments (FF4)
from Gertler and Karadi (2015), 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 30.
on impact (by about 1 bp on impact to 1.5 bp), an increase in the 5-year yield on impact,
a delayed decrease in industrial production, and a delayed decrease in the CPI.17
We now turn to potential international spillover effects of US monetary policy.
The traditional international transmission channels of monetary policy via aggregate
demand and via the exchange rate may not be the only ones. Because of the
increased importance of international financial flows, global intermediaries (banks,
asset managers) may transmit liquidity conditions cross-borders (see for example
Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012). Hence, it is plausible that the capital market frictions
studied in the context of the credit channel (or net worth channel) or the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy in a domestic context play also a role internationally. The
literature on financial crises has emphasized for a long time the role of capital flows
in fuelling domestic credit booms and the latter have been found to be one of the most
reliable early warning indicators of crises (see for example Gourinchas and Obstfeld
17. We tried numerous specifications including replacing the 5-year yield with the VIX or with corporate
spreads. In both cases, these variables increase on impact significantly. The results are robust. For further
discussion of robustness of the Gertler and Karadi (2015) results see Miranda-Agrippino (2016) and
Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017).
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FIGURE 2. Responses of UK variables to a 20-bp increase in the US 1-year rate. Instruments (FF4)
from Gertler and Karadi (2015), 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 19.93.
2012). Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) discuss the importance of the US Federal
Reserve as a driver of the global financial cycle and analyses in a large Bayesian VAR
the effect of a Fed loosening on the rest of the world using quarterly data. They find
that a positive monetary policy shock increases the leverage of banks and cross-border
capital flows and increases asset prices. Here, we estimate specifically the effect of
international financial spillovers of the United States on the United Kingdom. We
use the same instruments (FF4) as before and a similar specification of the VAR to
estimate the effect of a US monetary policy shock on the economy but this time on UK
variables. Figure 2 shows the effect of a 20-bp tightening in the 1-year US rate on the
United Kingdom. We use the RPIX that is the retail price index excluding mortgage
payments, industrial production, mortgage spread defined as UK mortgage rate minus
3-month bill, the dollar per sterling exchange rate and the UK 5-year rate as it is an
important interest rate in the United Kingdom. A US monetary policy tightening leads
to an increase on impact of about 8 bp in the mortgage spread and to an appreciation
of sterling vis-a-vis the dollar of about 1.1 bp. This is of the same order as the one
previously estimated when analysing the impulse responses of US variables, though
less precisely estimated. We see no significant impact on UK Industrial Production
or on the UK 5-year rate. We tend to find a slight increase on the UK RPIX index
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in the short run. These results are robust to a number of specifications (inclusion of
the VIX for example, which increases on impact) but estimates are less precise than
the ones for the US VAR. The F-stats are lower, though they still indicate very strong
instruments: they stand at about 20 compared to 30 for the US case. In Figure A.1
in the Appendix, we present another specification with UK corporate spreads and the
3-month UK T-Bill. Unlike the 5-year rate, the 3-month T-Bill tends to go up with a US
tightening, indicating some effect of US policy rates at the short end of the yield curve
in the United Kingdom. The UK corporate spread goes down with a Fed tightening.
The only available data for UK corporate spreads correspond to very long maturity
bonds (about 20 years). This is unlike the corporate spreads in the United States that
are short maturity and go up as the Fed tightens. We conjecture that this asymmetry in
reaction for corporate spreads is due to the short end of the yield curve in the United
Kingdom reacting to a US tightening more than the long end. Therefore, we find some
evidence that the monetary policy of the hegemon spills over into the United Kingdom
via financial variables (mortgage spreads and corporate spreads). This happens despite
the sterling dollar exchange rate being fully flexible.
6.2. United Kingdom: How does the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street fare?
We run the UK VAR on monthly data for the January 1982 to January 2015 period,
using 12 lags. We first run a VAR using a recursive identification scheme (Cholesky).
Our results, presented in Appendix in Figure A.2 confirm the inability of identifying
responses of asset prices with such timing assumptions: the asset prices do not react
significantly (not even the exchange rate) and we have a significant price puzzle.
Hence, we switch to our proxy SVAR framework and use SS movements monetary
policy events (rate decisions, minutes, inflation reports) as instruments for the period
January 2000 to January 2015. As we discussed in previous sections, surprises based
on movements of SS are not the direct analogue of the shocks measured by the Fed
Funds futures. They reflect changes in the cost of short-term bank credit aggregating
a combination of expectations regarding the future path of policy rates, the risk
premium of the LIBOR—including possible counterparty risk—and demand for cash
in the banking sector. Hence, movements in the LIBOR reflect both monetary policy
conditions and market turmoil. For example, during the financial crisis of 2008 LIBOR
spiked due to counter-party risk while Central Banks around the world were actively
cutting their policy rates. Figure A.3 in the Appendix shows a clustering of points
around the zero-rate change with a range of changes in the SS. It also shows some
outliers in SS changes at the time of market stress due to the financial crisis coinciding
with monetary policy rate announcements in 2008. During a large part of the relevant
period, announcements of monetary policy rates are invariably the same (a typical
statement would be that “the Bank of England maintains Bank Rate at 0.5% and
the size of the Asset Purchase Programme at 375 billion”18), and there is no other
18. From www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/decisions.aspx.
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FIGURE 3. Monetary policy surprises, derived from SS data around inflation reports and minutes.
information communicated to market participants at those times. Almost all policy
decisions on rate and purchases are therefore perfectly anticipated by the market as
shown by the Bloomberg Survey. Hence, we believe that using surprises in SS around
rate announcement times tend to pick up market disturbances rather than monetary
policy in our sample. We verify our conjecture by running a VAR using surprises
around policy rate announcement times as instruments. As expected, this VAR shows
signs of spurious identification with, in particular, a jump in UK Industrial Production
on impact and a significant price puzzle.19
On the other hand, surprises around minutes and inflation reports are more
meaningful as there is new information about the future policy stance that is generally
communicated to market participants at those occasions. Figure 3 shows the surprises
in SS around the inflation reports and minutes, which is the series of surprises we
will be using as our instruments as they are informative about future monetary policy.
Results are very different from the recursive VAR in Figure A.2 and are robust across
specifications. We instrument the 5-year rate because of data availability and because it
19. Results available upon request.
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FIGURE 4. Responses of UK variables to a 20-bp increase in the UK 5-year rate. Instruments SS
around inflation reports and minutes, 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 15.22.
is an important rate for the United Kingdom. Furthermore, our instruments are strong
with a F-stat of 15.22 and largely above 10 in all the specifications we ran for the 5-
year rate. Sterling appreciates on impact against the dollar, the corporate spread (long
maturities) goes up on impact and mortgage spreads tend go up on impact, Industrial
Production does not move on impact but decreases with a delay in some specifications,
RPIX is not significantly affected.
Results are similar when we include other asset prices such as the VIX as in
Figure 5. The VIX goes up on impact as the sterling exchange rate appreciates and
the corporate spread goes up on impact. IP declines with a delay and RPIX is not
affected.20
In contrast, when we try to estimate the effect of UK monetary policy shocks on
US variables, we do not find any significant responses. Hence, there is an asymmetry
in international spillovers: US monetary policy as one of the factors driving the global
financial cycle has spillovers on UK financial variables. But the reverse is not true:
20. In the Appendix (see Figure A.3), we present similar sets of results with the mortgage spread and
when using the FTSE instead of the VIX (see Figure A.4). The FTSE goes down on impact.
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FIGURE 5. Responses of UK variables and VIX to a 20-bp increase in the UK 5-year rate. Instruments
SS around inflation reports and minutes, 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 15.01.
UK policy does not affect US financial variables. This asymmetry may reflect the very
important role of the US dollar in international banking.
These results taken together tend to suggest that, as discussed in Ramey (2016),
extreme care has to be taken regarding the identification strategy and the specification
of the VAR. The robustness of the results has to be checked by adding enough lags in
the VAR. Cholesky identification is inadequate for small VARs with asset prices. When
using high-frequency instruments in proxy SVAR, it is very important to understand
which information is aggregated in the price of the instrument and which type of
information is being revealed at the time of the monetary policy announcements.
In the US case, FF do aggregate information about future monetary policy. Around
FOMC meetings, information revealed is about rate changes and forward guidance
because of the statement released at the same time as the rate change. Instrumenting
the 1-year rate allows to study the effect of monetary policy shocks on rates and
forward guidance on the financial channel of monetary policy. In the United Kingdom,
SS Futures are not futures of the policy rate. They aggregate information on future
monetary policy but also on bank funding conditions including counterparty risk and
liquidity conditions. Around rate announcement, information is revealed purely about
rate changes or purchases of assets. Around minutes and inflation reports, information
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is revealed about the future stance of monetary policy and about the judgement of the
Bank about future state of the economy. In the recent period, pure rate announcements
have brought in very little information on monetary policy. Surprises have reflected
more market conditions; hence, using surprises around rate adjustments would not
capture monetary policy shocks but rather market stress. In contrast, surprises around
minutes and inflation report have brought in information about medium to long-term
guidance prospects. Hence, instrumenting the 5-year UK rate by surprises of SS
Futures around minutes and inflation reports make sense and provide information
around the financial channel of monetary policy in the United Kingdom in the medium
run.
7. Conclusion
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to model more fully the process
of financial intermediation in the macroeconomy. Recent models show the importance
of the financial channels of monetary policy that operate via different capital market
imperfections due to moral hazard or risk shifting. The net worth channel of monetary
policy (as in Bernanke and Gertler 1995) and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
(as in Coimbra and Rey 2017) both imply an increase in credit and a decline in spreads
when monetary policy is loosened. In Coimbra and Rey (2017), fluctuations in funding
costs have additional effects: lower costs of funds due to an expansionary monetary
policy lead heterogeneous intermediaries to leverage differentially due to different
abilities to shift risk. This leads to a concentration of risk in the largest players and to
a sharper decline in risk premia when the interest rate is low as the most risk loving
intermediaries are the ones who price risk at the margin. Empirical tests looking
at these more specific predictions could help disentangle the risk-taking channel
from the net worth channel. This is an important endeavour as policy implications
differ.
Capital market imperfections play potentially an even bigger role in an environment
of large capital flows. We investigate empirically these financial channels in the US
and the UK economies as well as their international spillovers. Using an instrumental
proxy VAR approach, we find evidence of monetary policy transmission via the
financial channel measured by corporate spreads and mortgage spreads. For the United
States, the methodology captures monetary policy shocks encompassing movements
to the target rate and forward guidance and uses their effects on financial instruments
reflecting market expectations about the future policy rate (Fed Funds futures). For the
United Kingdom, the methodology captures monetary policy shocks distinguishing
between movements to the target rate and forward guidance. It uses the effects of
these different monetary policy shocks on financial instruments reflecting market
expectations about the future policy rates but reflecting also the risk premium of the
LIBOR and demand for cash in the banking sector (Short Sterling futures).
In both economies, a tightening of monetary policy leads to an increase in spreads.
We also find that US monetary policy induces financial spillovers into the UK financial
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markets, despite the flexible sterling dollar exchange rate whereas the reverse is not
true. This supports further the view of a global financial cycle (Rey 2013) partly
driven by the US Central Bank. Because of the very different institutional frameworks
for monetary policy in the United States and the United Kingdom and the different
financial instruments traded, our study is able to show separately the importance of
policy rate moves in the United States and of forward guidance, broadly defined, in
the United Kingdom. In this latter case, surprises in SS around minutes and inflation
reports are shown to have significant effects on UK financial spreads.
Further robustness work is undoubtedly needed however, and our results suggest
that, as discussed in Ramey (2016), extreme care has to be taken regarding the
identification strategy and the specification of the VAR. In that respect, increasing
the information set by including a larger number of variables as in Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2015) while using Bayesian estimation is an important robustness check.
Appendix A
FIGURE A.1. Responses of UK variables to a 20-bp increase in the US 1-year rate. Instruments
(FF4) from Gertler and Karadi (2015), 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 18.31.
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FIGURE A.2. Responses of UK variables to a 20-bp increase in the UK 5-year rate. Recursive
identification, 90% confidence intervals.
FIGURE A.3. Policy rate changes and monetary policy surprises, derived from SS data around rate
changes.
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FIGURE A.4. Responses of UK variables and VIX to a 20-bp increase in the UK 5-year rate.
Instruments SS around inflation reports and minutes, 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 12.8.
FIGURE A.5. Responses of UK variables including FTSE to a 20-bp increase in the UK 5-year rate.
Instruments SS around inflation reports and minutes, 90% confidence intervals. F-stat: 15.5.
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TABLE B.1. Data sources.
Variable Description Source
RPIX Retail price index excluding mortgage
interest payments, extended back using
retail prices index (SA)
ONS
IP Index of production (SA) ONS
5-year rate End month level of yield from British
Government Securities, 5-year Nominal
Zero Coupon
Bank of England
10-year rate End month level of yield from British
Government Securities, 10-year Nominal
Zero Coupon
Bank of England
Exchange rate US Dollars to one British pound, spot, end
month level
Bank of England
Mortgage rate Interest rate (fixed rate type) on loans for
house purchasing, over 1 and up to 5 years
maturity
Global Financial Database
Treasury bills (3
month)
End month level of discount rate, 3-month
Treasury bills, sterling
Bank of England
Corporate bond yields Monthly Corporate bond yields Three centuries of
macroeconomic data,
Bank of England
20-year rate Redemption yields on British government
securities, 20 years
Three centuries of
macroeconomic data,
Bank of England
United States data and
policy surprises21
Gertler and Karadi (2015) data set
Appendix B
UK Spreads. Mortgage spread is the difference between Mortgage rate and the 3
months T-Bill rate. Corporate spread is the difference between Corporate Bond Yields
and 20-year rate before January 1992 and 10-year rate after January 1992.
US Spreads. The Mortgage spread is the 30-year conventional mortgage rate minus
the 10-year constant maturity treasury rate. The commercial paper spread is the 3-
month AA nonfinancial rate minus the 3-month treasury rate.
Construction of Policy Surprises for the UK. The surprises were constructed using
Short Sterling future prices from Thomson Reuters Tick history database. For each
policy event, we are using a future contract with the closest available delivery month,
given that a reasonable amount of trading was happening in this instrument around the
time of the announcement. Following the literature, we are measuring the surprises
in a tight window around each policy event. To measure a policy surprise, we take a
difference of the implied average LIBOR rate 10 min before and 20 min after each
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announcement. To convert the surprises to monthly variable, we sum all the surprises
within the same month.
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